This will be a (mostly) non-technical talk describing my experience working on this project. The paper is motivated by healthcare exchanges, where a designer can't directly set prices, but can regulate which providers enter the market. The two extremes to have in mind are typical employer exchanges in the US (which typically limit entry to few providers) or government exchanges (which typically do not). The paper provides a mathematical model to reason about tradeoffs between these two paradigms. I will describe the model and results from this paper, but mostly focus on my experience learning about healthcare through the MD4SG working group, from the perspective of someone with a CS theory background. The referenced work is joint with Meryem Essaidi (Princeton) and Kira Goldner (Columbia).

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Matthew Weinberg's primary research interest is in Algorithmic Mechanism Design: algorithm design where users have their own incentives. His research focuses on domains such as auctions, cryptocurrencies, and (more recently) "social good" domains. Before joining the faculty at Princeton, Matt spent two years as a postdoc in Princeton's CS Theory group and was a research fellow at the Simons Institute during the fall of 2015 (Economics and Computation) and fall of 2016 (Algorithms and Uncertainty). He completed his Ph.D. at MIT in 2014, where he was advised by Costis Daskalakis, and graduated from Cornell University in 2010 with a B.A. in math.